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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the 2003-2007 session of the Scottish Parliament, legislation was passed which 
adopted the Weighted Inclusive Gregory Single Transferable Vote (WIG-STV) electoral system for 
the election of councillors to Scotland's 32 local authorities (LGSA 2004, Farrell & McAllister 
2003). STV systems requires voters to rank candidates in order of preference (1,2 etc) and candidates 
are elected in successive rounds of tallying, elimination and redistribution (for a detailed explanation 
see Farrell & McAllister 2003).  
Previous legislation adopted the additional member system for election of members of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSP). Additional member systems require voters to cast a single preference vote for a 
constituency MSP and for a list of candidates covering a larger region. The consequence of the new 
electoral system for local election was to significantly increase the complexity of both running an 
election day operation and the subsequent count. Partial automation, through the use of an e-counting 
system was adopted with the intention of making the election process more manageable. 
A number of changes to the Scottish voting system as a whole were also made including: ballot paper 
layout; security markings for ballot papers; ballot box design; scheduling of the declaration of results; 
distribution of counting centres; polling station operation; the election timetable; management of 
postal ballot papers; and the scale of publicity designed to raise awareness of the voting process. In 
addition, as a result of recent legislative changes (EAA 2006), members of the public were eligible to 
register with the Electoral Commission as election observers. This paper is the result of observations 
made by the authors during several of the system demonstrations and from the authors‟ experiences as 
observers on election day. During observations, a range of human factors and other issues were 
identified with respect to the voting system, some of which have been discussed at length in the 
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media.1 The introduction of new systems typically results in some disruption during implementation. 
Elections are a particularly difficult case, since the processes are enacted only infrequently, reducing 
the opportunities for incremental change to the system. The purpose of this paper is to describe some 
of the issues identified with the introduction of the new system to support the process of improvement 
for future elections. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology used for the 
observations. Section 3 describes the changes to the Scottish voting system as a result of the 
introduction of e-counting, including the effect on ballot paper design. Section 4 describes the e-
counting system itself, and discusses the human factors issues identified with the e-counting system. 
Section 5 outlines issues noted during the overnight counts across the three locations observed. 
Section 6 describes wider issues with regard to perceptions of the system operation during the course 
of the election. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions from the experience. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The observations themselves were undertaken by observers using the ethno-methodologically 
informed ethnography approach first developed at Lancaster University (Martin & Sommerville 2006, 
Viller & Sommerville 2000 and Crabtree, Nichols, O‟Brien, Rouncefield & Twidale 2000). 
Ethnography is the study of people in their own environment, as unobtrusively as possible. The 
process can be completed quickly, as in the case with this study of the election day polling stations and 
subsequent evening counts, or it can be undertaken over a more prolonged period of days or weeks. 
The data gathered for these observations includes conversations with staff, written documentation, 
photographs of the work environment and observations of the work processes themselves. Ethno-
methodologically informed ethnography does not attempt to explain why things occur in a given way 
(which would require suitable sociological theories and analysis) but instead focuses on recording 
what actually occurs. In this particular set of observations three count centres, and over 30 polling 
                                              
1 See https://www.indeedproject.ac.uk/lscits/Newspaper_Reports for an archive of news articles. 
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stations were observed between several researchers, the first time observations on this scale have 
either been attempted or even allowed independently for elections in the UK.  
3 VOTING SYSTEM 
The introduction of the e-counting system caused several changes to the Scottish voting system as a 
whole. In addition, several innovations were implemented independently of the use of e-counting. This 
section discusses changes to the surrounding voting system and their consequent impact on the 
election process. 
3.1 Overview of Voting Process 
From the perspective of the voter, some aspects of the voting process remain unchanged. Voting still 
took place in polling stations distributed throughout a given constituency. Voters registered on the 
electoral register are placed on an electoral roll, a document used to identify voters for a given 
election. As in previous elections in the mainland UK, no authentication of identification is required. 
Once identified, voter names are crossed from the electoral roll (to prevent double voting);   aA ballot 
paper is then removed from each of two packs (parliamentary and local authority. Ballot numbers 
(unique numbers printed on the ballots themselves) are recorded with the associated electoral roll 
number of the voter and the ballots handed to the voter. In contrast to previous elections, the ballot 
papers are not stamped with an “official mark” device, which punches a perforated pattern in the ballot 
paper. The voter completes the ballot papers and places them face down into a hopper on the ballot 
box. Voters who spoilt either of their ballot papers were entitled to a replacement. 
3.2 Ballot Paper Design 
Figure 1 shows the two different types of ballot papers used: one for the Parliamentary (AMS) election 
and the other for the local authority (STV) elections. The STV based election required the voter to 
number their preferences for candidates. They could use as many numbers as they wished, as long as 
these were consecutive from 1 upwards. The parliamentary ballot paper was split into two for the two 
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separate votes for AMS, which were colour coded. The voter places an X against a candidate on each 
side. The right hand column of the Parliamentary ballot paper lists candidates to be elected in a 
particular constituency. The left hand column listed party names or independents to be elected from 
across a larger region as „Additional Members‟. 
 
(a) Parliamentary (AMS) (b) Local Authority (STV) 
Figure 1: Ballot paper design 
 
TAKE IN FIGURE NO 1 
A variety of information sources were used to explain the new processes including distribution of 
voting information booklets by post, the “VoteScotand” website along with posters in polling stations 
and the introduction of information officers in larger polling stations. 
Nevertheless, several issues concerning the correct completion of ballot papers became apparent, 
evidenced by the large number of spoiled ballot papers that were eventually recorded - in excess of 
140,000 (Gould 2007). The most common mistake encountered was over-voting on the Parliamentary 
ballot paper. Despite the colour coding of the ballot paper and the flowchart-like instructions, voters 
misread the instruction “you have two votes” to mean that they could place two X‟s anywhere on the 
ballot paper, rather than marking each side of the ballot paper with exactly one X. Voters thus 
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commonly placed two Xs in only one column of the ballot paper, typically against candidates or 
parties with similar policy platforms (see Figure 2). The similar issues occurred with the Local 
Authority ballot papers. Voters placed X‟s next to each name instead of numbers, spoiling their ballot 
in their enthusiasm to elect a given party (as no clear first preference was indicated).  
 
Figure 2: Ballot paper over-voting (Parliamentary) 
TAKE IN FIGURE NO 2 
Some voters also completed the STV ballot paper in unanticipated ways. Instead of marking the ballot 
paper in order of preference of candidates, some voters placed a single number on the ballot box, 
which matched the row of the candidate they wished to vote for, see Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: An incorrectly completed local authority ballot paper 
TAKE IN FIGURE NO 3 
Initially, observers noted that ballot papers completed in this manner were rejected as void under rule 
43(1)(b), no first preference (SLGEO 2007). Officials eventually realised that voters were writing the 
row number of their first preference candidate in the box.  As a consequence, it was decided that such 
ballot papers could be corrected so that the voter had voted 1 for candidate „H‟ only (first preference). 
The reasons behind this misinterpretation were not discovered during observations.  Observers were 
unable to ascertain whether votes that had already been rejected were re-examined. 
3.3 Voting Privacy 
One consequence of the use of an e-counting system was that voters were asked not to fold their ballot 
papers, but instead to place them in the ballot boxes flat for scanning purposes. Whilst most voters 
complied with the change, a number insisted on folding their ballot papers. In addition, many of the 
ballot papers which were not folded were observable to polling station staff, since voters did not think 
to hold their ballot paper face down when approaching the ballot box, thus violating the privacy of 
their vote. In many cases the polling clerks could see that the voter had filled in the ballot paper 
incorrectly, but could not tell them in order to maintain the pretence of voting privacy. 
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3.4 Ballot Paper Production 
Two issues were observed with respect to the production of ballot papers. In one constituency there 
were a number of ballot books with the front and back reversed. This meant that staff were faced with 
the serial number rather than the ballot on opening, an error which was actually very useful as staff 
only needed to make a note of the serial number. As such, this may well prove to be a possible 
improved design for future elections. The discontinuation of the ”official mark” also simplified the 
process for staff considerably and reduced the risk of unintentionally invalid ballot papers. 
Some ballot books were also printed on paper which was too long. As a result, the scanning devices 
were unable to read the paper‟s barcodes, which were expected in a particular location on the reverse 
of the ballot. In this case count officials had to remove the strips by hand (without scissors – they 
didn‟t have any) by repeatedly folding and then tearing the ballots along the fold line.  A number of 
ballots ended up in manual entry due to damage during this process. 
 
3.5 Ballot Box Design 
The design of ballot boxes was different for the May 2007 elections from the black metal boxes used 
previously, a consequence of the introduction of the e-counting system. The scanning machines used 
for the e-counting process required ballot papers to be stacked and unfolded. The new ballot boxes 
were designed with wide apertures (so that folding was unnecessary) and a chute which ensured that 
ballot papers were stacked in the ballot box, rather than mixed. The observability of votes as ballot 
papers were placed in the ballot box is discussed above; however it is also notable that the new design 
changes the purpose of the ballot box as an anonymiser. The typical purpose of the ballot box is to 
make establishing links between ballot papers and voters a hard problem2, as modelled by a plethora of 
cryptographic/digital voting schemes (Fujioka et al 1992, Benaloh 1996, Chaum et al 2005, Chaum 
                                              
2 The task of linking ballot papers to voters is said to be hard rather than impossible because, in the UK, ballot paper numbers are recorded 
against voter‟s electoral roll numbers as a means of correcting electoral fraud (Blackburn 1995, RPA 1983). 
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2005). For the e-counting system, the new design of the ballot box reduced the purpose of the box 
merely to storage. 
The material robustness of the boxes was also problematic, since they were constructed from 
corrugated plastic. One well reported incident demonstrated the weakness of the boxes, when a polling 
place was attacked, ballot boxes breached and ballot papers damaged. The security of the box sticker 
seals was also questioned by polling clerks. There was a general belief that the boxes could be opened 
easily, and that this undermined the voter‟s confidence in the system. There were instances of security 
tags coming loose and anecdotal accounts of staff opening boxes to unfold folded ballots prior to the 
close of the polls. This compares to previous elections in which plastic tags were used to seal ballot 
boxes at the opening of polls; plastic tags provided better tamper evidence, since they need to be 
damaged in order to be removed. 
4 E-COUNTING SYSTEM 
The counting system procured by the Scottish Executive consists of several stages from the opening of 
ballot boxes to the declaration of a result, all of which require human intervention. This section 
describes the aspects of the counting system relevant to this paper. The hardware provided for the 
count consists of a central database server, a number of paper scanning machines, a number of 
workstations equipped with twin mirrored monitors, keyboard, mouse and barcode scanner; and 
several shelf areas used to store ballot papers at different stages of the counting process. The server 
was responsible for the management of the count, including storage of processed ballot images.  Users 
were identified and authenticated to the system using bar-coded identification cards. The second 
monitors on work stations permitted political representatives (candidates, agents and counting agents) 
and observers to view the operation of the counting system and decisions made from a public area (see 
PlateFigure 14).  Workstations are operated by pairs of local authority staff and scanning machines by 
the vendor‟s staff. Count „marshals‟ were responsible for moving ballot papers between stages of the 
count. 
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PlateFigure 14: Operators (right), political 
representatives and observers (left) at the twin 
monitor work stations. 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 1 
Initially, a ballot box is opened and the papers transferred to a cardboard batch box, together with a 
batch control sheet which records the number of ballot papers that were in the batch‟s ballot box when 
the box was sealed at the polling station. Ostensibly the reasoning for this simply being that the ballot 
boxes are large, cumbersome and not designed for situations where ballots are likely to be repeatedly 
loaded and unloaded. The batch box is then transferred to a shelf labelled “Awaiting Registration”, 
before being transferred to a work station. At the work station, a bar code on the batch control sheet is 
scanned, which results in the work station displaying a form for the number of ballot papers in the 
batch to be recorded. The batch is then transferred to a shelf labelled “Awaiting Scanning” and from 
there to a scanning machine. 
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Figure Plate 25: Scanning Machine 
 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 2 
The scanning machine is illustrated in PlateFigure 25. First, the batch control sheet is scanned to 
record which batch is to be scanned. The ballot papers are then loaded into the input hopper (top left 
tray) and passed through the scanner. Ballot papers that are accepted by the scanner are moved to the 
output hopper (lower left), whilst ballot papers that can‟t be scanned are moved to the reject hopper 
(lower right). Ballot papers that are rejected may be re-entered through the scanner, since each ballot 
paper is marked with a unique barcode (preventing double counting of votes). Ballot papers that are 
repeatedly rejected are placed into a red wallet in the batch box for later manual entry. The batch is 
then moved to a shelf labelled “Awaiting Verification” and from there to a work station. 
The verification process provides a check that the total number of ballot papers scanned and rejected 
by the scanning machine matches the number expected in the batch as recorded on the control sheet. 
At the work station, the control sheet bar code is again scanned, and the number of ballot papers in the 
red wallet recorded. If the batch is verified, it is transferred to a shelf labeledlabelled “Storage”, 
otherwise the batch is transferred to a shelf labelled “on hold” for investigation by the Returning 
Officer (RO the chief election official).  Batches containing unscanned ballot papers (in the red wallet) 
are placed on a shelf labelled “Awaiting Manual Entry”), from where they are transferred to a 
Returning Officer‟s workstation. The RO (or a depute) may enter a vote manually in a similar fashion 
to adjudication (see below). 
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(a) Key correction (Local Authority) (b) adjudication (Parliamentary) 
PlateFigure 36. 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 3 
The key correction (STV only, see PlateFigure 36a) and adjudication process provides for human 
correction of the character recognition decisions made by the e-counting system; typically where a 
voter has not marked the ballot paper in a manner that could be confidently interpreted by the 
software. A sizeable proportion of ballot papers were subject to this process. Electronic 
representations of batches are available for key correction and adjudication once they have been 
verified. The work station operator selects a batch from an available “queue” of batches listed by area 
name on the user interface. For key correction (the first stage), an operator is presented with a page of 
glyphs which the character recognition software has determined represent a particular character. The 
operator can choose to accept the choice made by the software, correct it, or mark the glyph as 
uncertain. For standard adjudication (the second stage), the operator is presented with electronic 
representations of the full ballot papers, the operator can correct the vote on the ballot paper, or reject 
the vote. Alternatively for difficult cases the ballots can be placed into a Returning officer adjudication 
queue.  
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Once all batches of ballot papers have been processed, the electronic representation of votes is 
extracted from the central database and passed to tallying software, which computes the results of the 
election. The Returning Officer is presented with these results for declaration. 
5 COUNT ISSUES 
This section discusses examples of human factors problems associated with the e-counting system 
observed across a number of counts. 
5.1 Postal ballots 
Postal ballots accounted for a sizeable proportion of votes cast in the election.  Folding of postal 
ballots (necessary to fit into the provided envelopes) introduced imperfections capable of jamming 
counting machines, requiring the papers to be extricated and re-scanned. The scanners also recorded 
the fold lines as annotations to the ballot, causing an adjudication to occur (see PlateFigure 36b for an 
example, one third the way down the ballot paper). One potential remedy would be to use larger 
envelopes for posting ballot papers (although this may incur extra costs).  
5.2 Ballot Paper Adjudication 
A number of usability issues were observed with the adjudication process.  In particular, the 
adjudication queue selection window (selection of un-adjudicated batches for processing- PlateFigure 
47) caused frustration and wasted effort.  There was no separation of Parliamentary and Local 
Authority ballots in the adjudication queues; nor did operators possess documentation for this purpose. 
Initially, operators were only permitted to complete the Parliamentary count on the first night, so they 
had to check each queue, often, inevitably going into a local election queue by mistake, until they  
memorised the names for the different areas. 
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Figure 7Plate 4:  Adjudication queue screen 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 4 
 
In addition, the adjudication interface presented three options for rejection of a ballot paper: 
 Over voting: placing two X‟s on a single race, for example. 
 ID discernable: The vote is void because it records the identity of the voter. 
 Void for uncertainty: a miscellaneous category for any situation where the voters preference 
is not clear; an X across two rows for example 
Electoral rules (SLGEO 2007) separate “over voting” and “void for uncertainty”, these categories 
were sometimes used interchangeably and in some cases the RO‟s deputes were observed not 
separating the two categories consistently themselves. This can in part be attributed to the far larger 
volume of adjudications than in previous elections.  Consideration may need to be given to employing 
a larger number of depute ROs to manage the election process. 
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The optical character recognition software was also a source of usability problems. When adjudicating 
STV ballots, the system would always suggest the most likely number, no matter how low the 
probability was (see Figure Plate 58 for an example). Observers noted that  staff progressively paid 
less consideration to the system‟s suggestions, as operators lost confidence in its ability to aid them. 
 
Plate 5Figure 8: Software OCR during key correction 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 5 
The amount of training received and / or knowledge retained on the system‟s features appeared to vary 
considerably across local authority staff. Some staff, for example, did not use the provided zoom 
function for inspecting ballot papers during adjudication, which was accessed via the keyboard 
“Ctrl+Shift” key sequence shortcut. At one count two depute ROs worked independently for a number 
of hours on opposite sides of a room, one using the zoom functionality and the other denying its 
existence. An on-screen button would have advertised the feature; indeed this was the only substantive 
feature of the system not accessible via the on-screen user interface. 
As operators familiarised themselves with the system, the rate of adjudication speeded up, particularly 
as staff learned to use keyboard shortcuts for functions. Although greater speed improved the 
efficiency of the counts, the operator‟s working partner, political representatives and observers were 
less able to scrutinise the adjudication decisions that were made. The time required to formulate an 
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objection meant that the operator may have adjudicated several further ballot papers before a concern 
could be expressed. Although the user interface was equipped with a “back” button, this only 
permitted an operator to step back one ballot paper from the current adjudication. By the time a 
decision had been made to raise an objection the window of opportunity had often passed. This 
limitation of the system had to be advertised to observers during the night (see Figure Plate 69). 
5.3 Environmental Factors 
Several concerns regarding operating environment were identified.  For example, the seats provided 
for counting machine operators were too low for the operators to reach the counting machine hoppers. 
The machines rarely operated correctly for more than a few seconds at a time; effectively this meant 
that operators had to stand whilst working. 
There were also frequent complaints from the adjudication operators, since although they were sitting 
down, their task made extensive use of the mouse. The system required users to move the mouse from 
one corner of the screen to another each time a vote was adjudicated. Consequently staff swapped 
roles every few minutes due to hand and arm pains. A better user interface layout, staff training and 
the provision of wrist supports could have greatly improved the working environment for staff. The 
layout of the user interface suggested that the designers of the system were not aware of common user 
interface design principles – Fitt‟s law (grouping common functions to avoid lengthy repetitive 
movements), for example.  
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Figure 9Plate 6: Reminder of the system’s limitations 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 6 
5.4 Data Entry 
Two operators were used for adjudication to reduce errors, however in most cases the main advantage 
was to remove mouse related fatigue problems instead, something that could largely have been 
avoided. Fatigue problems were not helped by the error messages exhibited by the system when 
encountering incorrect operations. Given the unusual nature of the count, and the time pressures, more 
careful design of these aspects could have aided the operators greatly. 
5.5 Usability and Security 
Section 3 described the use of bar-coded credentials for authenticating to a workstation. Workstations 
locked after a period inactivity for security purposes. The length of time before the screen locked 
however was quite long; this was most perceptible at the Returning officers adjudications, as the 
Returning officer deputes frequently discussed cases or left their station to perform other tasks. The 
use of lanyards for the credentials engendered good security practice as the operators did not have to 
remove the lanyard to scan the barcode. However at counts where clip on tags were used staff had to 
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remove the tag before scanning, in some counting centres staff degraded the security provided by 
leaving their barcode identifiers on their desk next to the scanner to save time, though in nearly all 
cases the staff member remembered to collect the badge before they left their stations. 
6 PERCEPTIONS OF THE E-COUNT SYSTEM’S DEPENDABILITY 
From the demonstrations and observations made of the e-count system in operation it became apparent 
that some consideration had been made to implement and demonstrate system dependability; the use 
of bar-coded badges for operator-work station authentication; isolation of the computer system 
networks at counts; and mirroring of server databases at counts. However, it is clear that the technical 
system itself was designed to be completely trusted (as distinct from trustworthy), whilst its operators 
were not. This may be satisfactory to the election officials who procured the e-count system, however 
it was not clear that the implications were adequately explained to candidates. For example, prior to 
the initiation of counting, observers and political representatives were invited to observe the “master 
clear down”, a process to prove the server database was empty via database queries. Whilst this was 
useful to demonstrate that the election officials had not attempted to subvert the system at the count, it 
did not demonstrate that the count system had not been already subverted! The assumption that the 
user interface presents an accurate representation of the internal state of the e-count system was not 
challenged, since this clearly requires some expertise in information systems. 
A second example is provided by the test process used to demonstrate a system has been set up 
correctly. During setup, the e-count system is tested on a “known result” set of ballot papers which 
have previously been hand counted. Whilst the test procedure does provide some indication that the 
system has been set up correctly it does not demonstrate that the system will perform correctly for the 
“live” election, since the e-count system is tested in a “test configuration” mode, rather than in the 
configuration for the election. 
Work stations connected to large displays were used to give real-time results of count progress (see 
Figure 10Plate 7) from queries of the count system database.  However, the common failure of this 
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feature undermined stakeholder‟s confidence in the system. At some counts, the information was 
merely slow,  at others the system failed completely. The displays themselves were not a feature of the 
system discussed at demonstrations prior to the count, suggesting that it may have been a late addition 
to the system. Late feature additions are often high risk procedures, since there may be inadequate 
time to test the feature or its effect on the larger system. 
In comparison, the previous hand count system was considerably more transparent. For hand counts, 
candidates appoint counting agents who are able to observe the processing of all ballot papers and the 
votes they record. Consequently, candidates are able to obtain an estimate of the result of an election, 
typically within a few percent of the final result. 
 
Figure 10Plate 7: Plasma information display screen 
TAKE IN PLATE NO 7 
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This uncertainty lowered perceived confidence and some questioned the system‟s transparency. To 
compensate, a number of political representatives were observed instead undertaking the hand tally 
estimates of adjudicated electronic ballots. In addition, at some counts, officials provided printouts of 
information extracted from the database server, effectively bypassing the plasma screens to ameliorate 
the lack of information provided. A remedy to this lack of information could have been to slow down 
the rate of scanning of ballot papers, such that the votes they record are visible to observers. However, 
the decision was made to process ballot papers as efficiently as possible in order to obtain a result 
early on in the night. 
 
7 FUTURE WORK & CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has outlined some of the human factors and dependability related issues observed with the 
use of e-counting systems during the Scottish elections; provided some discussion of the causes of the 
problems and proposed some remedies. Our intention is not to suggest that the e-counting system 
failed, that the system is unusable, or should not be used for future elections. Rather, as with all new 
systems, observers are able to identify and propose remedies to problems not obvious to designers, 
thus improving the system for future use. 
Despite the problems identified in this paper with the system, our perception of the system as a whole 
is that it performed relatively well for the local STV vote, which could not have been realistically 
achieved by a hand count; but considerably less so for the parliamentary vote, which proved slower 
than its hand count equivalent on this occasion. Although the timetable for some of the counts was 
delayed by almost 24hrs, results were released for the entire country by the Friday afternoon. The 
introduction of new systems into existing processes is commonly fraught with difficulty and the rarity 
of elections as events mean that implementing incremental change is difficult. 
It is hoped that future observations of local by-elections will provide a contrasting viewpoint of 
smaller scale processes. Interviews with election officials and other participants in the Scottish 
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Elections are planned for the future in order to gain further understanding and perspectives about the 
deployment of the e-counting technology.  
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